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Abstract
We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides
with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g.,
for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable,
i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been
proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core).
An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only
solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with
the core.
JEL classification: C62, C71, C78.
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1 Introduction
In a roommate market (see Gale and Shapley, 1962), a finite set of agents has to be partitioned
into pairs (roommates) and singletons. We will refer to such a partition as a matching. Each
agent has strict preferences over each of the other agents (i.e., sharing a room with him) and
staying alone (or relying on an outside option). Hence, a roommate market is a simple example
of hedonic coalition as well as network formation. In hedonic coalition formation (see Bogo-
molnaia and Jackson, 2002), a set of agents has to be partitioned and agents have preferences
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over coalitions (i.e., all subsets of agents). Thus, for roommate markets coalition formation is
restricted to coalitions of at most two agents. In network formation (see Jackson and Watts,
2002), links between agents can be established and agents have preferences over their links (or
even the entire network structure). Thus, for roommate markets network formation is restricted
to at most one link per agent (and agents have preferences over this direct link only). Moreover,
a roommate market can be interpreted as an extension of one of the most famous and simplest
type of (two-sided) matching markets, a so-called marriage market. In a marriage market, agents
are either male or female, and a man (woman) only wants to be matched to a woman (man) or to
him(her)self. This setting is equivalent to a roommate market where the set of agents consists of
two disjoint subsets and every agent in a certain subset prefers staying alone to being matched to
another agent in the same subset. Hence, roommate markets are a particularly interesting class
of matching markets because they lie in the “intersection” of network and coalition formation
models.
In all the matching, coalition, and network models mentioned above, stability is a central
property. For roommate markets, a matching is stable if all roommates are mutually acceptable
and no pair of agents would prefer to be roommates instead of having their current matches.
It is well-known that for marriage and roommate markets this (pairwise) stability notion is
equivalent to core stability. However, when extending the class of marriage markets to the class
of roommate markets a problem occurs: while the core for a marriage market is always non-
empty, the core of a roommate market can well be empty (see Gale and Shapley, 1962). As a
consequence, roommate markets can be considered an important benchmark for the development
of solution concepts for matching, network and coalition formation models that may exhibit an
empty core or set of stable matchings, network or coalition structures.1
One way to obtain a non-empty solution concept for all models mentioned above is to apply
a (myopic) blocking dynamics as introduced by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). As these blocking
dynamics are finite Markov processes, there exists always at least one absorbing set, i.e., a
minimal set of states that once entered throughout the blocking dynamics is never left. Thus,
the set of solutions (matchings or coalition/network structures) contained in all absorbing sets
– the set of absorbing solutions – is always non-empty. However, if the core is non-empty,
the set of absorbing solutions does not always coincide with the core, i.e., the set of absorbing
solutions is not always core consistent. As an example consider blocking dynamics in markets
with indivisible goods as analyzed by Serrano and Volij (2007) and Bochet, Klaus, and Walzl
(2007) or hedonic coalition formation (see Example 2 or Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002).
For solvable roommate markets, i.e., roommate markets with a non-empty core, Diaman-
toudi, Miyagawa, and Xue (2004) prove the existence of “paths to stability,” i.e., the blocking
dynamics always ends up in a stable matching. In a recent paper, In˜arra, Larrea, and Molis
(2008a) offer an extension of this result to general roommate markets. They introduce so-called
P -stable matchings as a solution concept and show that the blocking dynamics always ends up
in a P -stable matching. Their analysis is based on Tan’s (1991) notion of stable partitions. In
another paper, In˜arra, Larrea, and Molis (2008b) introduce the set of absorbing matchings as a
solution concept for roommate markets. They relate the absorbing sets to P -stable matchings
and find that all absorbing sets share a common structure.
1For more general models of matching as well as coalition or network formation, various stability notions exist
and pairwise stability is no longer equivalent to core stability.
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In this paper, we are interested in stochastic stability for roommate markets, i.e., we analyze
blocking dynamics where agents with a small probability make mistakes in their myopic blocking
decisions. This approach has first been used for equilibrium selection in non-cooperative game
theory (see Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993) and has been adapted to network
formation (and marriage markets in particular) by Jackson andWatts (2002). As in Diamantoudi
et al. (2004) and In˜arra et al. (2008a), we adapt the blocking dynamics introduced in Roth and
Vande Vate (1990) for roommate markets. In each period, the process is at a matching µ and a
pair of agents (or a single agent) is randomly selected. If each agent of the pair (or the singleton)
is better off being matched to the other agent (himself) than staying with his partner under µ,
the pair (the singleton) blocks µ and the pair (the singleton) is matched while former matching
partners under µ become single. This process induces a sequence of matchings called a blocking
path. As the blocking dynamics resembles a finite Markov process, there is always an absorbing
set. It follows directly from the definition of the blocking dynamics that an absorbing set is
a singleton if and only if the respective matching is stable. With this, the existence of paths
to stability for solvable roommate markets as in Diamantoudi et al. (2004) implies that the
set of stable matchings and the set of absorbing matchings coincide in a roommate market if
and only if the roommate market is solvable. Likewise, the blocking dynamics has at least one
non-singleton absorbing set if and only if the roommate market is not solvable.
The set of stochastically stable matchings in a roommate market, however, is not determined
by the existence of paths to stability. Instead, the following result turns out to be crucial. Let
the distance between two matchings be measured by the number of agents who have the same
partner and the distance between a matching and an absorbing set be measured by the maximum
number of agents who have the same partner. We show that for any non-absorbing matching
µ and any absorbing set A, there exists a blocking path starting from µ that does not “wander
off”, i.e., a blocking path that ends in an absorbing matching that is either closer or at equal
distance to the absorbing set A (Theorem 1). Using Theorem 1, we establish our main result: for
roommate markets the set of absorbing matchings equals the set of stochastically stable match-
ings (Theorem 2). As corollaries (Corollaries 1 and 2) we obtain that a matching in a marriage
market or a solvable roommate market is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable.
That is, stochastic stability characterizes the core of a solvable roommate market and character-
izes the set of absorbing matchings for a general roommate market. Theorem 2 also generalizes
Diamantoudi et al.’s (2004, Theorem 1) “random paths to stability” result (Corollary 3).
An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only
solution concept that is core consistent (i.e., if the core is non-empty, the solution coincides with
the core) and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core. Finally, we explain
with two examples of many-to-many matching and hedonic coalition formation (Examples 1
and 2) why our main result is a very strong structural result for roommate markets that cannot
easily be extended to more general markets.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the roommate model. In Section 3,
we introduce the blocking dynamics and the concept of stochastic stability. Section 4 contains
the main results (Theorems 1 and 2). We conclude in Section 5.
3
2 A Roommate Market
In a roommate market, a finite set of agents N has to be partitioned in pairs (roommates) and
singletons. Each agent i ∈ N has preferences Ri over sharing a room with any of the agents in
N\{i} and having a room for himself (or consuming an outside option such as living off-campus).
We assume that agents’ preferences are total orders2 over N . In particular, for all i ∈ N , k Ri j
and j Ri k if and only if j = k. The strict preference relation associated with Ri is denoted by
Pi. If i Pi j then j is unacceptable to i. Since the set of agents N remains fixed throughout this
paper, we simply denote a roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) by its preference profile
R = (Ri)i∈N .
A solution to a roommate market, a matching µ, is a partition of N in pairs and singletons.
Alternatively, we describe a matching by a function µ : N → N of order two, i.e., for all i ∈ N ,
µ(µ(i)) = i. We denote the set of matchings for all roommate markets defined for the set of
agents N by M . Agent µ(i) is agent i’s mate, i.e., the agent with whom he is matched to share
a room (possibly himself). If µ(i) = i then we call i a single. With some abuse of notation we
write µ Ri µ
′ if and only if µ(i)Ri µ
′(i).
A matching µ is blocked by a pair {i, j} ⊆ N (possibly i = j) if j Pi µ(i) and i Pj µ(j). If
{i, j} blocks µ, then {i, j} is called a blocking pair for µ. A pair {i, j} ⊆ N (possibly i = j) that
is not a blocking pair for µ is called a non-blocking pair for µ. For any matching µ and any pair
{i, j} (possibly i = j), the matching µ′ that results from µ by matching {i, j} is defined by
µ′(k) :=


i if k = j;
j if k = i;
k if k = µ(j) 6= j;
k if k = µ(i) 6= i;
µ(k) if k 6= i, j, µ(i), µ(j).
i.e., the pair is matched, if i (j) was not single then his previous mate becomes single, and all
other agents have the same mates as before. We say that µ′ results from µ by matching {i, j}.
A matching is individually rational if there is no blocking pair {i, j} with i = j. We denote
the set of individually rational matchings for roommate market R by I(R). A matching is stable
if there is no blocking pair. We denote the set of stable matchings for roommate market R by
S(R). A roommate market R is solvable if S(R) 6= ∅. Otherwise it is called unsolvable. Note
that for any roommate market the set of stable matchings equals the core.
A marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) is a roommate market such that N is the
union of two disjoint sets NM and NW (men and women), and each agent in NM (respectively
NW ) prefers being alone to being matched with any other agent in NM (respectively NW ). An
individually rational matching for a marriage market respects the partition of agents into two
types and never matches two men or two women.
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that all marriage markets are solvable and provided an
unsolvable roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962, Example 3).
2A total order is a binary relation that satisfies antisymmetry, transitivity, and totality (comparability).
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3 Stochastic Stability
3.1 The Unperturbed Blocking Dynamics and Absorbing Matchings
For each roommate market R, we model the blocking dynamics by aMarkov process (M,T (R)).3
The state space is the set of matchings M and T (R) is a transition matrix that induces the
following blocking dynamics. In each period t = 1, 2, . . ., the process is at a matching µ(t) and
a pair {i, j} ⊆ N (possibly i = j) of agents is randomly selected with some positive (but not
necessarily identical) period independent probability.4 If {i, j} is a blocking pair for µ(t), then
the process moves from µ(t) to the matching µ(t+ 1) that results from µ(t) by matching {i, j}.
Otherwise, µ(t + 1) = µ(t). For µ, µ′ ∈ M , let T (R)(µ, µ′) denote the probability that the
dynamic process moves from matching µ to µ′ from one period to the next.5 Note that for
µ, µ′ ∈M , µ 6= µ′, T (R)(µ, µ′) > 0 if and only if there is a blocking pair for µ that results in µ′.
For any µ ∈M ,
∑
µ′∈M T (R)(µ, µ
′) = 1.
We call a sequence of matchings µ1, . . . , µk a path from µ1 to µk if for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},
µl+1 results from µl by matching a pair.
6 A path µ1, . . . , µk is a blocking path from µ1 to µk
if for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, µl+1 results from µl by matching a blocking pair. For any path
µ1, . . . , µk we define T (R)(µ1, . . . , µk) := T (R)(µ1, µ2) ·T (R)(µ2, µ3) · . . . ·T (R)(µk−1, µk). Thus,
T (R)(µ1, . . . , µk) is the probability that the blocking dynamics moves from µ1 to µk along the
path µ1, . . . , µk. Whenever for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, µl+1 6= µl, we have T (R)(µ1, . . . , µk) > 0 if
and only if µ1, . . . , µk is a blocking path.
Note that blocking pairs are always better off in the short run (even though they might
be worse off later), i.e., agents are myopic but they do not make mistakes. We will consider
a dynamic process with a positive probability of mistakes (or perturbations) in Section 3.2.
For further reference we therefore label the blocking process as defined in this section as the
unperturbed blocking dynamics.
An important solution for any dynamic process is its collection of absorbing sets (or – here
– matchings). A set A ⊆ M is an absorbing set if it is a minimal set of matchings that once
entered throughout the blocking dynamics is never left, i.e., for all µ, µ′ ∈ A, there exists a
blocking path µ, . . . , µ′, and for all µ ∈ A and µ′′ /∈ A, there exists no blocking path µ, . . . , µ′′.7
The collection of absorbing sets is denoted by A(R). Note that A(R) is a collection of mutually
disjoint sets of matchings. It is convenient to also denote the set of absorbing matchings by
A(R) = {µ ∈ M : there exists A ∈ A(R) with µ ∈ A}. Illustrating examples of roommate
markets, their absorbing sets, and absorbing matchings can be found in In˜arra et al. (2008b,
Example 2) and Appendix D (Example 3).
The next lemma shows that the set of absorbing matchings deserves attention as a solution
concept for roommate markets: the set of absorbing matchings is always non-empty and for
solvable roommate markets the set of absorbing matchings coincides with the set of stable
matchings. These results are straightforward implications of the definition of an unperturbed
blocking dynamics and Diamantoudi et al. (2004, Theorem 1).
3We summarize basic notions and terminology of Markov processes in Appendix A.
4We make the assumption of time homogeneity for notational convenience. Our results hold as long as for
every period the probability for any pair of agents to be selected is bounded away from zero.
5Note that there may be more than one blocking pair that takes µ to µ′. E.g., let N = {1, 2}, 1 P1 2, 2 P2 1,
µ(1) = 2, and µ′(1) = 1. Then, {1} and {2} are both blocking pairs for µ.
6Such a pair can be a non-blocking pair (in particular, a pair of matched agents who remain matched).
7In˜arra et al. (2008b) use a different but logically equivalent definition of absorbing sets.
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Lemma 1. Absorbing Matchings
For any unperturbed blocking dynamics (M,T (R)),
(i) A(R) 6= ∅.
(ii) {µ} ∈ A(R)⇔ µ ∈ S(R).
(iii) S(R) ⊆ A(R) ⊆ I(R).
(iv) S(R) = A(R) if and only if R is a solvable roommate market.
Proof. Statement (i) follows from the finiteness of M . Statement (ii) is a direct implication of
the definition of an unperturbed blocking dynamics and the fact that there are no blocking pairs
for a stable matching. Statement (ii) implies the first inclusion of statement (iii). To prove the
second inclusion of statement (iii), suppose there is µ ∈ A(R)\I(R). Then, since µ 6∈ I(R), there
is i ∈ N with i Pi µ(i). Let µ
′ be the matching obtained from µ by (self-)matching {i}. Then,
µ′ and µ are in the same absorbing set. This, however, contradicts the absence of a blocking
path from µ′ to µ. Hence, A(R) ⊆ I(R). To prove statement (iv), consider R with S(R) 6= ∅
and suppose there is µ ∈ A(R)\S(R). Since µ /∈ S(R), Diamantoudi et al. (2004, Theorem 1)
implies that there exists a blocking path µ, . . . , µ′ such that µ′ ∈ S(R). Hence, µ and µ′ belong
to the same absorbing set. By statement (ii), {µ′} ∈ A(R). Hence, µ = µ′; a contradiction. So,
A(R)\S(R) = ∅ and S(R) = A(R). If R is not solvable, S(R) = ∅ and S(R) 6= A(R) by (i).
Statement (iv) of Lemma 1 is also mentioned by In˜arra et al. (2008b, Corollary 2). However,
our proof is different from In˜arra et al.’s (2008b, page 9) reasoning, which relies on the particular
structure of so-called P -stable matchings (as introduced in In˜arra et al., 2008a).
3.2 The Perturbed Blocking Dynamics and Stochastic Stability
We now perturb the blocking dynamics (M,T (R)) by allowing for mistakes, i.e., if a non-blocking
pair {i, j} (possibly i = j) that is not yet matched is selected then it ends up being matched
(by mistake) with a small probability ǫ > 0. Then, for any two matchings µ and µ′, µ 6= µ′,
the probability that the perturbed dynamics moves from µ to µ′ from one period to the next is
given by
T ǫ(R)(µ, µ′) := T (R)(µ, µ′) + ǫ
∑
{i,j}∈NB(µ,µ′)
q(µ, {i, j}),
where NB(µ, µ′) is the set of non-blocking pairs for µ that when matched result in µ′ and
q(µ, {i, j}) is the probability that the pair {i, j} is selected when the blocking dynamics is in
state µ. For any µ ∈M , we define T ǫ(R)(µ, µ) := 1−
∑
µ′ 6=µ T
ǫ(R)(µ, µ′).8 We call the resulting
Markov process (M,T ǫ(R)) the perturbed blocking dynamics. Note that the perturbed blocking
dynamics is ergodic: as mistakes induce (indirect) transitions between any two matchings its
unique absorbing set is the entire state space M . Together with its aperiodicity this implies
that the perturbed blocking dynamics exhibits a unique invariant distribution pǫ with support
M that displays the long run probability distribution over matchings, i.e., for any µ ∈M , pǫ(µ)
is the probability that the perturbed blocking dynamics will be at matching µ in the long run.
The limit invariant distribution p∗ of blocking dynamics (M,T (R)) is the (unique) invariant
distribution pǫ of a perturbed blocking dynamics (M,T ǫ(R)) in the limit of ǫ → 0, i.e., p∗ :=
limǫ→0 p
ǫ. Hence, p∗(µ) is the probability that the process will be at matching µ in the long
run and in the limit of vanishing mistakes. Young (1993, Theorem 4 (i)) applied to our model
8Note that T ǫ(R)(µ, .) is a well-defined probability distribution over M .
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implies that the limit invariant distribution exists and that it is an invariant distribution of the
blocking dynamics (M,T (R)). The support of every invariant distribution of the unperturbed
blocking dynamics is a (non-empty) collection of its absorbing sets. Matchings in the support of
p∗ are called stochastically stable. Hence, if a matching µ is stochastically stable, the perturbed
blocking dynamics will be at µ in the long run and in the limit of vanishing mistakes with strictly
positive probability (i.e., p∗(µ) > 0). We denote the set of stochastically stable matchings by
SS(R).
Lemma 2 (Young, 1993, Theorem 4(i)).
For any unperturbed blocking dynamics (M,T (R)), ∅ 6= SS(R) ⊆ A(R).
Young (1993) provides a general methodology to determine the set of stochastically stable
matchings, which boils down to the following procedure for our model.
Consider the set of directed graphs that have vertex set M . Then, any graph is defined by
its set of directed edges. We allow an edge from µ′ to µ′′, denoted by [µ′, µ′′], if µ′′ results from
µ′ by matching a pair. A µ-tree Tµ (or a spanning tree) is a graph such that for every µ
′ ∈ M
with µ′ 6= µ there is exactly one (cycle-free) sequence of edges (a path) from µ′ to µ. Denote by
Tµ the set of all µ-trees. The irreducibility of the perturbed blocking dynamics guarantees that
Tµ is non-empty.
Let [µ′, µ′′] be an edge in a µ-tree Tµ ∈ Tµ. The edge-resistance r(µ
′, µ′′) indicates whether
or not a mistake is needed to move from µ′ to µ′′,
r(µ′, µ′′) :=
{
0 if T (R)(µ′, µ′′) > 0;
1 otherwise.
The tree-resistance r(Tµ) of a µ-tree equals the sum of corresponding edge-resistances, i.e.,
r(Tµ) =
∑
[µ′,µ′′]∈Tµ
r(µ′, µ′′). Finally, the stochastic potential of µ ∈ M , denoted by γ(µ),
is the minimal tree-resistance over all µ-trees, i.e., γ(µ) = minTµ∈Tµ r(Tµ). A µ-tree Tµ with
r(Tµ) = γ(µ) is a least resistance µ-tree. The set of stochastically stable matchings SS(R) can
now conveniently be characterized as the set of matchings with minimal stochastic potential.
Lemma 3 (Young, 1993, Theorem 4(ii)).
Consider any unperturbed blocking dynamics (M,T (R)). Let µ ∈ M . Then, µ ∈ SS(R) if and
only if for all µ′ ∈M , γ(µ) ≤ γ(µ′).
4 Stability and Stochastic Stability
In Section 4.1 we define a distance measure between matchings and absorbing sets and establish
various preliminary results. The key result of this section is that for any non-absorbing matching
µ and any absorbing set A, there exists a blocking path starting from µ that does not “wander
off”, i.e., a blocking path that ends in an absorbing matching that is either closer or at equal
distance to the absorbing set A (Theorem 1).
In Section 4.2 we establish the main result of this article: for roommate markets the set of
absorbing matchings equals the set of stochastically stable matchings (Theorem 2). For solvable
roommate and marriage markets, this implies the coincidence of stochastically stable and stable
matchings (Corollaries 1 and 2). Furthermore, Theorem 2 implies Diamantoudi et al.’s (2004,
Theorem 1) “random paths to stability” result (Corollary 3).
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4.1 Blocking Paths and the Distance Between Matchings
Given two matchings µ and µ′ let m(µ, µ′) denote the number of agents that have the same
mate under µ and µ′, i.e., m(µ, µ′) = |{i ∈ N : µ(i) = µ′(i)}|. Interpreting m(·, ·) as a measure
for the distance between two matchings we say µ′ is closer to µ than µ′′ (or equivalently, µ is
closer to µ′ than to µ′′) if m(µ, µ′) > m(µ, µ′′).9
In order to measure the distance between a matching and a set, we define for all matchings
µ and A ⊆ M , m(µ,A) := m(A,µ) := maxµ′∈Am(µ, µ
′) and say that for all matchings µ
and A,A′ ⊆ M , A is closer to µ than A′ (or equivalently, µ is closer to A than to A′) if
m(µ,A) > m(µ,A′).
Finally, to measure the distance between two sets, we define for all A,A′ ⊆M , m(A,A′) :=
maxµ∈Am(µ,A
′) and we say that for all A,A′, A′′ ⊆M , A′ is closer to A than A′′ (or equivalently,
A is closer to A′ than to A′′) if m(A,A′) > m(A,A′′).
In what follows, we investigate the changes in the distance between matchings and between
matchings and absorbing sets due to blocking and mistakes. To this end, we consider an absorb-
ing set A ∈ A(R), a matching µ ∈M \ A(R), and a matching µ′ ∈ A with m(µ, µ′) = m(µ,A),
i.e., there is no matching µ′′ ∈ A that is closer to µ than µ′.
First, consider the case that the pair {i, j} blocks both µ and µ′.
Lemma 4. Let µ, µ′ ∈ M and {i, j} ⊆ N be a blocking pair for µ and µ′. Let µ˜ and µ˜′ be the
matchings that result from µ and µ′ by matching {i, j}. Then, m(µ˜, µ˜′) ≥ m(µ, µ′).
Proof. We prove m(µ˜, µ˜′) ≥ m(µ, µ′) by showing that for all k ∈ N , [µ(k) = µ′(k)] ⇒ [µ˜(k) =
µ˜′(k)]. Let k ∈ N . Suppose µ(k) = µ′(k).
(i) Let k 6∈ {i, j, µ(i), µ(j), µ′(i), µ′(j)}. Then, µ(k) = µ˜(k) and µ′(k) = µ˜′(k).
(ii) Let k ∈ {i, j}. Note that µ˜(i) = µ˜′(i) = j and µ˜(j) = µ˜′(j) = i. Thus, µ˜(k) = µ˜′(k).
(iii) Let k ∈ {µ(i), µ(j), µ′(i), µ′(j)}\{i, j}. Assume, without loss of generality, that k = µ(i).
Thus, µ(k) = µ′(k) = i 6= k. But then, since k 6∈ {i, j}, µ˜(k) = µ˜′(k) = k.
In all cases (i), (ii), and (iii), we can conclude that µ˜(k) = µ˜′(k).
Next, we consider the case that there is a blocking pair {r, s} with r 6= s for µ that is not a
blocking pair for µ′.
Lemma 5. Let µ, µ′ ∈M be such that µ ∈ I(R)\A(R), µ′ ∈ A ∈ A(R), and m(µ, µ′) = m(µ,A).
Suppose there exists a blocking pair {r, s} with r 6= s for µ that is not a blocking pair for µ′.
Then, there exists a blocking path µ = µ1, . . . , µL for µ such that m(µL, A) > m(µ,A).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proof of Lemma 5 parallels the proof of the Claim in Diamantoudi et al. (2004, Theo-
rem 1). The main difference is that we have to assume that there is a blocking pair for µ that
is not a blocking pair for µ′, while their analysis is restricted to singleton absorbing sets (i.e., a
stable matching µ′) which implies the absence of any blocking pair for µ′.
9The function d :M×M → R with d(µ, µ′) = |N |−m(µ, µ′) is a distance function on the set of matchings as it
satisfies (i) for all µ, µ′ ∈M , d(µ, µ′) ≥ 0 and d(µ, µ′) = 0 if and only if µ = µ′; (ii) symmetry, i.e., for all µ, µ′ ∈M ,
d(µ, µ′) = d(µ′, µ); and (iii) the triangle inequality, i.e., for all µ, µ′, µ′′ ∈M , d(µ, µ′′) ≤ d(µ, µ′) + d(µ′, µ′′).
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For the construction of µ′-trees in the analysis of stochastic stability, we have to find paths
from one absorbing set to any other with the least number of mistakes. For this, we will have
to prove the existence of a blocking path from a matching µ ∈ M \ A(R) to a matching in
an absorbing set such that this latter matching does not lie strictly further away from a fixed
absorbing set A ∈ A(R) than µ (Theorem 1). The proof of this result in turn requires an
extension of the analysis of single blocking pairs (Lemmas 4 and 5) to paths of blocking pairs.
A path of blocking pairs for µ is a finite sequence of pairs {i1, j1}, {i2, j2}, . . . , {ip, jp} such that
{i1, j1} is a blocking pair for µ1 := µ, {i2, j2} is a blocking pair for the matching µ2 that results
from µ1 by matching {i1, j1}, . . ., and {ip, jp} is a blocking pair for the matching µp that results
from µp−1 by matching {ip−1, jp−1}. Let µp+1 be the matching that results from µp by matching
{ip, jp}. We call µp+1 the matching induced by {i1, j1}, {i2, j2}, . . . , {ip, jp}. Similarly, we call the
blocking path µ = µ1, . . . , µp+1 the blocking path for µ induced by {i1, j1}, {i2, j2}, . . . , {ip, jp}.
Lemma 6. Let µ, µ′ ∈ M be such that µ ∈ I(R) \ A(R), µ′ ∈ A ∈ A(R), m(µ, µ′) = m(µ,A).
Suppose {i1, j1}, {i2, j2}, . . . , {iK , jK} is a path of blocking pairs for both µ and µ
′. Let µ =
µ1, . . . , µK be the induced blocking path for µ. Suppose m(µk, A) ≤ m(µ,A) for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
Then, m(µK , A) = m(µ,A).
Proof. Let µ′ = µ′1, . . . , µ
′
K be the induced blocking path for µ
′. By assumption, m(µ1, µ
′
1) =
m(µ1, A) = m(µ,A). Assume, by induction hypothesis, that k < K is such that m(µk, µ
′
k) =
m(µk, A) = m(µ,A). Then,
m(µk+1, µ
′
k+1) ≥ m(µk, µ
′
k) = m(µk, A) = m(µ,A) ≥ m(µk+1, A) ≥ m(µk+1, µ
′
k+1),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 4, the equalities from the induction hypothesis,
the second inequality from the assumptions, and the last inequality from the definition of m.
Hence, all inequalities are in fact equalities and m(µk+1, µ
′
k+1) = m(µk+1, A) = m(µ,A). Thus,
by induction, for k + 1 = K, m(µK , A) = m(µ,A).
Lemma 6 facilitates the proof of the following theorem which for any non-absorbing matching
µ and for any absorbing set A establishes the existence of a blocking path from µ to an absorbing
matching µ′ such that µ is not closer to A than µ′ (see Figure 1). This result turns out to be
the cornerstone for our analysis of stochastic stability.
Theorem 1. Existence of blocking paths that do not “wander off”
Let A ∈ A(R) and µ ∈ M\A(R). Then, there exists a blocking path µ = µ1, . . . , µK for µ such
that µK ∈ A(R) and m(µK , A) ≥ m(µ,A).
We prove Theorem 1 by showing that the following algorithm is well-defined and that it
terminates in a finite number of steps.
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Figure 1: Theorem 1, blocking paths that do not “wander off”
Algorithm. Let A ∈ A(R) and µ ∈M\A(R).
Step I. If µ /∈ I(R), then unmatch one by one all agents that have an unacceptable mate
under µ. Let µ = µ1, . . . , µL be the corresponding blocking path. Hence, µL ∈ I(R). Then,
m(µL, A) ≥ m(µ,A). (This follows from Lemma 1(iii) A(R) ⊆ I(R).) If µL ∈ A(R), then stop.
Otherwise set µ := µL.
Step II. Let µ′ ∈ A be such that m(µ,A) = m(µ, µ′).
Step III. If each path of blocking pairs for µ
(i) is also a path of blocking pairs for µ′, and
(ii) does not induce a matching closer to A,
then take a path of blocking pairs for µ that induces a blocking path µ = µ1, . . . , µK for µ such
that µK ∈ A(R) and stop. By Lemma 6, m(µK , A) = m(µ,A).
Step IV. If some path of blocking pairs for µ
(i) is also a path of blocking pairs for µ′, and
(ii) induces a matching closer to A,
then take a path of blocking pairs for µ that induces a blocking path µ = µ1, . . . , µL for µ such
that m(µL, A) > m(µ,A). If µL ∈ A(R), then set µK := µL and stop. Otherwise set µ := µL
and go to Step II.
Step V. Note that if this step is reached, then there exists a path of blocking pairs for
µ that is not a path of blocking pairs for µ′. Take a shortest such path of blocking pairs
{i1, j1}, {i2, j2}, . . . , {iL, jL} for µ. Thus, the first L − 1 blocking pairs induce a blocking path
µ = µ1, . . . , µL for µ and a blocking path µ
′ = µ′1, . . . , µ
′
L for µ
′. Furthermore, the L-th blocking
pair for µ, {iL, jL}, is not a blocking pair for µ
′
L.
10 Then, by Lemma 6, either
(i) for some k, 1 < k ≤ L, m(µk, A) > m(µ,A), or
(ii) m(µL, A) = m(µ,A).
10Since µ is individually rational, µL is also individually rational. Therefore iL 6= jL.
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Case (i): If µk ∈ A(R), then set µK := µk and stop. Otherwise set µ := µk and go to Step II.
Case (ii): If µL ∈ A(R), then set µK := µL and stop. Otherwise set µ := µL and µ
′ := µ′L and
go to Step VI.
Step VI. Note that if this step is reached, then µ and µ′ are such that µ ∈ I(R) \ A(R),
µ′ ∈ A ∈ A(R), m(µ, µ′) = m(µ,A), and there exists a blocking pair {r, s} (r 6= s) for µ that
is not a blocking pair for µ′. By Lemma 5, there exists a blocking path µ = µ1, . . . , µL for µ
such that m(µL, A) > m(µ,A). Take such a path. If µL ∈ A(R), then set µK := µL and stop.
Otherwise set µ := µL and go to Step II.
Lemma 7. The algorithm is well-defined and terminates in a finite number of steps.
Proof. Lemmas 5 and 6 ensure that the algorithm is well-defined. Note that starting from
Step II, either the algorithm terminates in Steps III, IV, V, or VI (with a desired matching µK),
or the algorithm returns to Step II with a matching in M \ A(R) that is closer to A than the
previous matching µ of Step II. Since the distance to A is finite, the algorithm terminates after
finitely many steps.
4.2 The Main Result
Theorem 1 is key in the construction of µ-trees to prove the stochastic stability of all absorbing
matchings.
Theorem 2. Roommate Markets: SS=A
For any roommate market R, the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of
absorbing matchings, i.e., SS(R) = A(R).
Proof. Consider a roommate market R. First, we determine the stochastic potential of all
absorbing matchings. More precisely, we show that if |A(R)| = k, then for all µ ∈ A(R),
γ(µ) = k − 1. Then, we conclude that A(R) = SS(R).
Let A(R) = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak} and µ ∈ A1. Note that at least one mistake is needed to
connect any two absorbing sets. Hence, for all µ ∈M , γ(µ) ≥ k − 1. We prove γ(µ) = k − 1 by
constructing a µ-tree Tµ with tree-resistance k − 1.
Step 1. Note that we can connect all absorbing matchings in A1 \ {µ} to µ without cycles and
without mistakes. This creates a subtree T1 with tree-resistance r(T1) = 0 of the final µ-tree Tµ.
Next, we show how to connect all absorbing matchings in A2 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak to T1 with one
mistake per absorbing set by constructing subtrees T2, . . . , Tk with T1 ⊂ T2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Tk ⊆ Tµ.
For this construction, we order the absorbing sets A2 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak according to their distance to
A1: without loss of generality, m(A1, A1) > m(A1, A2) ≥ . . . ≥ m(A1, Ak) (see Figure 2).
Step 2. Let µ1 ∈ A1 and µ2 ∈ A2 be such that m(µ1, µ2) = m(µ1, A2), i.e., µ1 and µ2 minimize
the distance between A1 and A2. Since µ1 6= µ2, there exists a pair {i, j} (possibly i = j) such
that µ1(i) = j and µ2(i) 6= j. Then, let µ˜2 be the matching that results from µ2 by matching
such a pair {i, j}. Note that m(µ1, µ˜2) > m(µ1, µ2) and therefore, m(A1, µ˜2) > m(A1, A2) and
µ˜2 /∈ A2 ∪ . . .∪Ak. Furthermore, by construction r(µ2, µ˜2) = 1 (if r(µ2, µ˜2) = 0, then µ˜2 ∈ A2).
Suppose that µ˜2 /∈ A1. Then, µ˜2 ∈M \A(R) and by Theorem 1, there exists a blocking path
µ˜2, . . . , µˆ1 such that µˆ1 ∈ A(R) and m(µˆ1, A1) ≥ m(µ˜2, A1). Recall that no absorbing matching
in A2 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak is closer to A1 than µ2 (and that µ˜2 is closer to A1 than µ2). Thus, µˆ1 ∈ A1.
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Figure 2: Proof of Theorem 2, Steps 1 and 2
Let µˆ be the first matching on the path µ2, µ˜2, . . . , µˆ1 that is connected to T1. We add the path
µ2, µ˜2, . . . , µˆ to T1 to obtain a subtree with tree-resistance 1 of the final µ-tree Tµ. For µ˜2 ∈ A1,
the path we add to T1 equals µ2, µ˜2 = µˆ1 and again obtain a subtree with tree-resistance 1 of
the final µ-tree Tµ.
Next, we connect all matchings in A2\{µ2} to µ2 without cycles and without mistakes. Thus,
we obtain a subtree T2 of the final µ-tree Tµ that connects all absorbing matchings in A1 ∪ A2
and some non-absorbing matchings with µ (see Figure 2). Let S2 ⊂ M denote the latter set of
non-absorbing matchings. The tree-resistance is r(T2) = 1.
Steps 3 up to k. Let l ∈ {3, . . . , k} and assume that we have constructed a subtree Tl−1 with
r(Tl−1) = l − 2 of the final µ-tree Tµ that connects all absorbing matchings in A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Al−1
and all non-absorbing matchings in Sl−1 with µ.
Let µ1 ∈ A1 (not necessarily the same µ1 as in previous steps) and µl ∈ Al be such that
m(µ1, µl) = m(µ1, Al), i.e., µ1 and µl minimize the distance between A1 and Al. Since µ1 6= µl,
there exists a pair {i, j} (possibly i = j) such that µ1(i) = j and µl(i) 6= j. Then, let µ˜l be the
matching that results from µl by matching such a pair {i, j}. Note that m(µ1, µ˜l) > m(µ1, µl)
and therefore, m(A1, µ˜l) > m(A1, Al) and µ˜l /∈ Al ∪ . . . ∪ Ak. Furthermore, by construction
r(µl, µ˜l) = 1 (if r(µl, µ˜l) = 0, then µ˜l ∈ Al).
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Figure 3: Proof of Theorem 2, Step 7 and Least Resistance µ-Tree
Suppose that µ˜l /∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Al−1. Then, µ˜l ∈ M \ A(R) and by Theorem 1, there exists a
blocking path µ˜l, . . . , µˆ1 (not necessarily the same µˆ1 as in previous steps) such that µˆ1 ∈ A(R)
and m(µˆ1, A1) ≥ m(µ˜l, A1). Recall that no matching in Al∪ . . .∪Ak is closer to A1 than µl (and
that µ˜l is closer to A1 than µl). Thus, µˆ1 ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪Al−1 and µl, µ˜l, . . . , µˆ1 is a path from µl
into A1 ∪ . . . ∪Al−1. Let µˆ be the first matching on the path µl, µ˜l, . . . , µˆ1 that is connected to
Tl−1. We add the path µl, µ˜l, . . . , µˆ to Tl−1 to obtain a subtree with tree-resistance l − 1 of the
final µ-tree Tµ. For µ˜l ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪Al−1, the path we add to Tl−1 equals µl, µ˜l and again obtain
a subtree with tree-resistance l − 1 of the final µ-tree Tµ.
Next, we connect all matchings in Al\{µl} to µl without cycles and without mistakes. Thus,
we obtain a subtree Tl of the final µ-tree Tµ that connects all absorbing matchings in A1∪. . .∪Al
and some non-absorbing matchings with µ. Let Sl ⊂ M denote the latter set of non-absorbing
matchings. (Note Sl ⊇ Sl−1.) The tree-resistance is r(Tl) = l − 1.
After k steps we have constructed a subtree Tk of the final µ-tree Tµ that connects all
(absorbing) matchings in A(R) and all (non-absorbing) matchings in Sk with µ. The tree-
resistance is r(Tk) = k − 1 (see Figure 3).
A Least Resistance µ-Tree. Finally, by Theorem 1, we can connect any remaining non-
absorbing matching in M \ (A(R) ∪ Sk) without mistake to Tk through a zero resistance path
(as before, paths have to be truncated if they contain already connected matchings). The
resulting tree Tµ is a µ-tree with tree-resistance k − 1 (see Figure 3). Hence, γ(µ) = k − 1.
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A(R)=SS(R). As already mentioned in the beginning of the proof, at least one mistake is
needed to connect any two absorbing sets. Hence, for all µ′ ∈ M and µ ∈ A(R), γ(µ′) ≥
k − 1 = γ(µ). Hence, by Lemma 3, A(R) ⊆ SS(R). By Lemma 2, A(R) ⊇ SS(R). Hence,
A(R) = SS(R).
Theorem 2 and Lemma 1(iv) imply that for solvable roommate and marriage markets stochastic
stability and stability coincide.
Corollary 1. Solvable Roommate Markets: SS=S
For any solvable roommate market R, the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with
the set of stable matchings, i.e., SS(R) = S(R).
Corollary 2. Marriage Markets: SS=S
For any marriage market R, the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of
stable matchings, i.e., SS(R) = S(R).
Remark 1. Robustness of Results for Different “Mistake Dynamics”
Jackson and Watts (2002, Theorem 2) establish a very similar result to Corollary 2. However,
they consider a different mistake dynamics where agents only break links by mistake, but do not
form new links by mistake. In our model this corresponds to restricting mistakes to single agents,
i.e., the only “pairs” {i, j} that make mistakes are those with i = j.11 We prove in Appendix C
that Theorem 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2 also hold for the restricted mistake dynamics (and that
therefore we can also obtain Jackson and Watts’s Theorem 2 as a corollary).
Not allowing a pair of (two) agents to match by mistake clearly affects Step 2 (and very
similarly, Steps 3 up to k) in the proof of Theorem 2. To be more specific, it can no longer be
taken for granted that a pair {i, j} that is matched in µ1 but not in µ2 can be matched with
one mistake (which was sufficient to demonstrate that we only need one mistake to connect any
two absorbing sets). However, structural properties of absorbing sets of roommate problems
as derived by In˜arra et al. (2008b) and the decomposability of stable matchings (Gusfield and
Irving, 1989, Lemma 4.3.9; Klaus and Klijn, 2008, Lemma 2) can be utilized to show that again
only one mistake (this time by a single agent) is needed to connect any two absorbing sets (for
a detailed discussion see Appendix C).
Finally, note that by definition of our mistake dynamics, if a pair of agents is matched then
at most one mistake is made. In other words, they make a mistake if exactly one of the agents is
worse off, but they also make only one mistake if both of the agents are worse off. As explained
above (see also Appendix C) we in fact only need single agents to make mistakes. Hence, our
results are also valid with a mistake dynamics where the matching of two agents that makes
both of them worse off counts as two individual mistakes. △
Finally, we obtain Diamantoudi et al.’s (2004) so-called random path to stability result as
follows. For any solvable roommate market R, pick a stable matching µ′ and construct a µ′-tree
using the technique of the proof of Theorem 2. Recall that by Lemma 1(ii) the µ′-tree only
contains singleton absorbing sets such that each absorbing set corresponds to exactly one of the
stable matchings. Furthermore, the only edges in the µ′-tree with edge-resistance 1 are edges
that start from a stable matching. Hence, starting from any unstable matching µ ∈ M \ S(R)
the µ′-tree determines a sequence of zero resistance edges – a blocking path for µ – to one of
the stable matchings.
11Our notion of the mistake dynamics coincides with that of Jackson and Watts (2002, p. 277) for network
formation. They restrict the mistake dynamics only for the analysis of marriage markets.
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Corollary 3 (Diamantoudi et al., 2004, Theorem 1). Random Paths to Stability
For any solvable roommate market R and any unstable matching µ ∈ M \ S(R) there exists a
blocking path µ = µ1, . . . , µK for µ such that µK is stable, i.e., µK ∈ S(R).
5 Concluding Remarks
We first discuss the role of stochastic stability in “validating” the set of absorbing matchings as
the solution concept that properly extends the core to non-solvable roommate markets. Second,
with two examples of many-to-many matching and hedonic coalition formation we explain why
our main result is a very strong structural result for roommate markets that cannot easily be
extended to more general markets.
5.1 Stochastic Stability as Solution Validation Device
We have already discussed in the Introduction that roommate markets are very “simple” markets
that lie in the intersection of more general models of matching, network, and coalition formation.
Unfortunately, the most prominent solution concept for many basic matching markets – the
set of (pairwise/core) stable matchings – is not applicable since for some roommate markets
no stable matchings exist. Several solution concepts for non-solvable roommate markets have
been discussed. Here we focus on those solution concepts that are “core consistent”, i.e., that
coincide with the set of stable matchings whenever it is non-empty. We are aware of four such
core consistent extensions:
1. Absorbing matchings A: as proven in Lemma 1(iv), for all solvable roommate markets R,
A(R) = S(R) (see also In˜arra et al., 2008b, Corollary 2).
2. Maximum stable matchings MS: Tan (1990) defines a maximum stable matching as a
matching with a “maximum number of disjoint pairs of persons such that these pairs
are stable among themselves, i.e., no two persons, who are not paired together but have
matched partners, both prefer each other to their partner under the matching.” We
denote the set of maximum stable matchings for a roommate market R by MS(R). Since
for solvable roommate markets the set of single agents is the same at any stable matching
(e.g., Klaus and Klijn, 2008, Theorem 1), it follows that for all solvable roommate markets
R, MS(R) = S(R).
3. Almost stable matchings AS: Abraham et al. (2006) analyze matchings with a minimal
number of blocking pairs and refer to all such matchings as almost stable. We denote
the set of almost stable matchings for a roommate market R by AS(R). Since for any
stable matching of a solvable roommate market the number of blocking pairs equals zero,
it follows that for all solvable roommate markets R, AS(R) = S(R).
4. P -stable matchings PS: In˜arra et al. (2008a) use Tan’s (1991) notion of stable partitions
for roommate markets to define the set of P -stable matchings (each stable partition P
induces a set of P -stable matchings). We denote the set of P -stable matchings for a
roommate market R by PS(R). From Tan’s (1991) characterization of solvable roommate
markets it follows easily that for all solvable roommate markets R, PS(R) = S(R) (see
also In˜arra et al., 2008a, Remark 3).12
12Note that for all roommate markets R, A(R) ∩ PS(R) 6= ∅ (see In˜arra et al., 2008a,b).
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Example 3 in Appendix D describes a (non-solvable) roommate market R such that [A(R) (
MS(R) and A(R) ) MS(R)], [A(R) ( AS(R) and A(R) ) AS(R)], and [A(R) ( PS(R) and
A(R) ) PS(R)].
In order to judge which of the above-described solution concepts is the best extension of
the core to unsolvable roommate markets, we propose to apply stochastic stability as a second
validation criterium (the first being core consistency). A stochastically stable matching is a
prediction for the long-run state of the blocking dynamics that is robust with respect to small
perturbations. By Corollary 1, for solvable roommate markets the core coincides with the
set of stochastically stable matchings, i.e., stochastic stability characterizes the core and no
stable matching is singled out as a “better” prediction. By Theorem 2, stochastic stability also
characterizes the set of absorbing matchings. Hence, the set of absorbing matchings is the only
solution concept for roommate markets that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability
characteristic with the core.
5.2 Stochastic Stability and Stability for More General Matching Models
In this section we consider extensions of the roommate model for which pairwise stability does
not necessarily coincide with core or other stability notions anymore. Without loss of generality,
whenever referring to stability, we have pairwise stability (i.e., one of the weakest stability
notions in these models) in mind.
In the case of a solvable roommate market, the existence of a blocking path to stability (as
proven by Diamantoudi et al., 2004) implies that the set of absorbing matchings coincides with
the set of stable matchings (see the proof of Lemma 1(iv)). Therefore, by Lemma 2, SS ⊆ S.
The stochastic stability of all stable matchings (see Theorem 2 and Corollary 1), however, is not
implied by the existence of a blocking path to stability but hinges on the existence of blocking
paths that do not “wander off” (see Theorem 1). In the following, we provide an example of a
many-to-many matching market that demonstrates that the mere existence of a blocking path
to stability does not guarantee stochastic stability of all stable matchings.
Kojima and U¨nver (2008, Theorem 1) prove the existence of blocking paths to stability in
many-to-many matching markets where every agent of one side of the market has substitutable
preferences and every agent of the other side of the market has responsive preferences with
quota. The many-to-many matching market in Example 1 fulfills these preference conditions,
but not all stable matchings are stochastically stable. In particular, blocking paths that do not
“wander off” as in Theorem 1 do not always exist.
Example 1. Many-to-Many Matching: SS ( S
We consider a many-to-many matching market with three firms F1, F2, F3 and three
workers w1, w2, w3. Table 1 first lists agents’ preferences in its columns, e.g., firm
F1’s preferences are such that {w3, w2} PF1 {w3, w1} PF1 {w2, w1} PF1 {w3} PF1 {w2} PF1
{w1} PF1 ∅ . . ., where . . . means that for F1 all other sets of workers are worse than
having no workers. Note that firms have responsive preferences with quota 2 and
workers have substitutable preferences. Second, we list the following matchings in the
rows of Table 1: µ′ = {{F1, w3}, {F1, w2}, {F2, w1}, {F2, w3}, {F3, w2}, {F3, w1}} and µ =
{{F1, w1}, {F2, w2}, {F3, w3}}. Both matchings are stable and therefore absorbing.
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firm F1 firm F2 firm F3 worker w1 worker w2 worker w3
µ {F1} {F2} {F3}
µ′ {w3, w2} {w1, w3} {w2, w1} {F2, F3} {F1, F3} {F2, F1}
{w3, w1} {w1, w2} {w2, w3} {F2} {F3} {F1}
{w2, w1} {w3, w2} {w1, w3} {F3} {F1} {F2}
{w3} {w1} {w2}
{w2} {w3} {w1}
µ {w1} {w2} {w3}
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1: Example 1 – preferences and matchings µ and µ′.
To prove that µ is stochastically stable while µ′ is not, we proceed in two steps. In Step 1, we
construct a path from µ′ to µ with one mistake. In Step 2, we show that there is no path from
µ to µ′ with only one mistake. Observe that µ and µ′ are the only stable matchings. Hence,
γ(µ) = 1 and γ(µ′) > 1 such that µ is the unique stochastically stable matching (see Lemma 3).
We are therefore left with Steps 1 and 2.
Step 1. To construct a path from µ′ to µ with one mistake, suppose the blocking dynamics
is in µ′ and a single agent, say F1, is selected. Then, by one mistake, {F1, w2} is abandoned.
This results in the matching µ1 = {{F1, w3}, {F2, w1}, {F2, w3}, {F3, w1}, {F3, w2}} which can
be blocked by {F1, w1} resulting in µ2 = {{F1, w3}, {F1, w1}, {F2, w3}, {F3, w2}}. Note that µ2
is blocked by {F2, w2} resulting in µ3 = {{F1, w3}, {F1, w1}, {F2, w3}, {F2, w2}}. Finally, µ3 can
be blocked by {F3, w3} resulting in µ4 = {{F1, w1}, {F2, w2}, {F3, w3}} = µ.
Step 2. To show that there is no path with only one mistake from µ to µ′ suppose the blocking
dynamics is in µ. We distinguish between two cases: (i) a single agent, or (ii) a pair of agents
is selected.
For case (i), suppose without loss of generality that F1 is selected. Then, by one
mistake, {F1, w1} is abandoned and both agents are single. This results in the match-
ing µ1 = {{F2, w2}, {F3, w3}}. Observe that this matching cannot be blocked by any sin-
gle agent or any pair that includes w2 or w3 and the only blocking pairs are {F1, w1},
{F2, w1}, and {F3, w1}. If {F1, w1} is selected, µ is reached. Blocking by {F2, w1} re-
sults in µ2 = {{F2, w1}, {F2, w2}, {F3, w3}}. Matching µ2 can only be blocked by {F1, w1}
and {F3, w1}. If {F1, w1} is selected, µ is reached. Blocking by {F3, w1} results in µ3 =
{{F2, w1}, {F3, w1}, {F2, w2}, {F3, w3}}. But µ3 can only be blocked by {F1, w1} resulting in µ.
A symmetric argument holds if µ1 is blocked by {F3, w1}. Hence, all blocking paths from µ1
lead back to µ.
For case (ii), suppose that the blocking dynamics is in µ and suppose without loss of generality
that {F1, w2} is selected. Then, by one mistake, {F1, w2} is established. Now observe that the
resulting matching, µ∗ = {{F1, w1}, {F1, w2}, {F2, w2}, {F3, w3}}, cannot be blocked by any pair
that contains w2 or w3, nor by any single agent except for w2. But in this case, blocking yields µ.
Hence, our example demonstrates that there is no structure comparable to Theorem 1 for
many-to-many matching markets – even if the domain is restricted in such a way that paths to
stability can be guaranteed. ⋄
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In the absence of a blocking path to stability, singleton absorbing sets (i.e., stable matchings)
and non-singleton absorbing sets can co-exist and are candidates for the set of stochastically
stable matchings. The following example demonstrates that the topology of an absorbing set is
not decisive with respect to stochastic stability. Example 2, taken from Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002), analyzes a hedonic coalition formation game (see Banerjee et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia and
Jackson, 2002) where both absorbing sets (a singleton and a non-singleton set) are stochastically
stable.
Example 2. Hedonic Coalition Formation: SS ) S
We consider hedonic coalition formation with 3 agents N = {1, 2, 3}. Table 2 lists agents’
preferences in its columns, e.g., agent 1’s preferences are such that {1, 2} P1 N P1 {1, 3} P1 {1}.
agent 1 agent 2 agent 3
{1, 2} {2, 3} {1, 3}
N N N
{1, 3} {1, 2} {2, 3}
{1} {2} {3}
Table 2: Example 2 – preferences.
Observe that N is the unique stable (and core) coalition structure in this example and
therefore forms a singleton absorbing set. Moreover, pairwise blocking generates the cycle
{{2, 3}, {1}} → {{1, 3}, {2}} → {{1, 2}, {3}} → {{2, 3}, {1}}. As each coalition structure in
the cycle has only one blocking coalition, the cycle induces a (non-singleton) absorbing set.
The only remaining coalition structure is the set of singletons which is obviously not part of an
absorbing set.
To see that N and the cycle have a stochastic potential of one, we construct paths with one
mistake from N to the cycle and a path with one mistake from the cycle to N .
Suppose the blocking dynamics is in N and the coalition {1, 2} is selected. By mistake of
agent 2, {1, 2} blocks N and the resulting coalition structure is {{1, 2}, {3}} which is a coalition
structure in the cycle.
Now suppose the blocking dynamics is in {{1, 2}, {3}} and N is proposed. By mistake of
agent 1, N blocks {{1, 2}, {3}}. ⋄
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Appendix
A Markov Process Terminology
• A Markov process (X,T ) is determined by a discrete state space X and a mapping T :
X × X → [0, 1] where T (x, x′) describes the probability that the state equals x′ ∈ X in
period t+1 whenever it was in x ∈ X in period t. Clearly, for all x ∈ X,
∑
x′∈X T (x, x
′) = 1.
Here we restrict ourselves to finite, time-homogeneous Markov processes, i.e., X is a finite
set and transition probabilities induced (and captured in T ) do not depend on time.
• An absorbing set A ⊆ X is a minimal set of states that once entered throughout the
dynamic process is never abandoned.
• An absorbing set A is aperiodic whenever it does not contain any deterministic and non-
trivial cycle, i.e., there is no sequence of at least two states x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ A such that for
all i = 1, .., n− 1, xi ∈ A and T (xi, xi+1) = T (xn, x1) = 1. Note that a sufficient condition
for the aperiodicity of an absorbing set A is that for some x ∈ A, 0 < T (x, x) < 1, i.e., the
Markov process exhibits sufficient (but not complete) inertia.
• By the weak fundamental theorem of Markov processes every aperiodic absorbing set A ⊆
X corresponds to exactly one invariant distribution p : X → [0, 1] with p · T = p and
supportA, i.e.,
∑
x∈A p(x) = 1. If all absorbing sets of a Markov process are aperiodic, then
its set of invariant distributions is defined as the convex hull of the invariant distributions
of its absorbing sets. The support of an invariant distribution p of such a Markov process
is therefore a (non-empty) collection of absorbing sets.
• By the fundamental theorem of Markov processes the unique invariant distribution p that
is induced by an aperiodic absorbing set A ⊆ X describes the probability p(x) that the
process will be at state x ∈ A if it reached a state in A and propagated forever, i.e., for
all x ∈ A and all probability distributions p˜ : A→ [0, 1], p(x) = (limk→∞ p˜ · T
k)(x).
• A Markov process is ergodic if it has a unique absorbing set.
• A Markov process is irreducible if it is ergodic and the unique absorbing set coincides with
the state space X.
• A perturbed Markov process (X,T ǫ) is a Markov process such that for all x, x′ ∈ X,
limǫ→0 T
ǫ(x, x′) = T (x, x′), and for all ǫ > 0, T ǫ(x, x′) > 0 implies that there is an r ≥ 0
with 0 < limǫ→0 ǫ
−rT ǫ(x, x′) <∞. Here we restrict ourselves to irreducible and aperiodic
perturbed Markov processes. Therefore, the invariant distribution pǫ of (X,T ǫ) is unique.
• The limit invariant distribution p∗ of a Markov process (X,T ) is the invariant distribution
pǫ of a perturbed process (X,T ǫ) in the limit of ǫ→ 0. Young (1993, Theorem 4(i)) implies
that p∗ := limǫ→0 p
ǫ exists and is an invariant distribution of (X,T ).
• A state in the support of p∗ is stochastically stable.
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B Proof of Lemma 5
The proof parallels the proof of the Claim in Diamantoudi et al. (2004, Theorem 1). To extend
their claim from solvable roommate markets to all roommate markets we assume that there is
a blocking pair for µ that is not a blocking pair for µ′. (For solvable roommate markets there
are no blocking pairs for µ′ at all.) Step 9 of the proof crucially depends on this assumption.
Moreover, we employ a slightly different measure for the distance between two matchings: Dia-
mantoudi et al. (2004) count the numbers of pairs (including singletons) that are common to
both matchings, whereas we count the number of agents who have the same mate under both
matchings.13
Step 1. By Lemma 1(iii), µ′ ∈ A implies µ′ ∈ I(R).
Step 2. If µ is blocked by a pair that is matched in µ′, then this blocking pair induces a
matching µ2 with m(µ2, µ
′) ≥ m(µ, µ′) + 1 and Lemma 5 is satisfied with µL = µ2. Hence, we
can make the following assumption.
D1. µ ∈ I(R) and there exists no blocking pair {i, j}, i 6= j, for µ such that µ′(i) = j.
If µ′ is blocked by a pair that is matched in µ, then this blocking pair induces a matching
µ′2 ∈ A with m(µ, µ
′
2) ≥ m(µ, µ
′) + 1; contradicting m(µ, µ′) = m(µ,A). Hence, we can make
the following assumption.
D2. µ′ ∈ I(R) and there exists no blocking pair {i, j}, i 6= j, for µ′ such that µ(i) = j.
Step 3. Define f : N → N by
f(i) :=
{
µ(i) if µ(i) Pi µ
′(i);
µ′(i) otherwise.
i.e., f(i) is whomever agent i prefers between µ(i) and µ′(i).
Step 4. For all i ∈ N ,
f(i) = i⇔ µ(i) = µ′(i) = i.
“⇐” follows from the definition of f .
“⇒” follows from µ, µ′ ∈ I(R) and the strictness of preferences.
Step 5. For all i ∈ N such that f(i) = j 6= i,
[f(i) = µ(i)⇒ f(j) = µ′(j)] and [f(i) = µ′(i)⇒ f(j) = µ(j)].
Obviously, both statements are true if µ(j) = µ′(j)(= i). Hence, assume µ(j) 6= µ′(j). To prove
the first part, assume by contradiction that f(i) = µ(i) and f(j) = µ(j) 6= µ′(j). This implies
i = µ(j)Pj µ
′(j). But as µ′(j) 6= µ(j) = i, it follows that µ(i) 6= µ′(i) and j = µ(i)Pi µ
′(i). This
violates D2 because then {i, j} is a blocking pair for µ′ even though they are matched at µ. A
symmetric argument proves the second part by using D1. This implies that for all i ∈ N ,
[µ(i) Pi µ
′(i)⇒ µ′(f(i)) Pf(i) µ(f(i))] and [µ
′(i) Pi µ(i)⇒ µ(f(i)) Pf(i) µ
′(f(i))].
Step 6. For all i ∈ N ,
f(f(i)) = i⇔ µ(i) = µ′(i).
13In contrast tom(., .) as introduced in Section 4, the measure in Diamantoudi et al. (2004) cannot be normalized
to a distance function on the set of matchings, because two identical and two distinct matchings may well have
the same number of common pairs and singletons.
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“⇐” follows directly from the definition of f .
“⇒” follows for f(i) = i by Step 4. So, suppose that f(i) = j 6= i. Without loss of generality
assume that f(i) = j = µ(i). Then, by Step 5, f(j) = µ′(j). The assumptions f(f(i)) = i and
f(i) = j imply f(j) = i. Hence, µ′(j) = i, and this together with µ(i) = j implies that i and j
are mates at µ and µ′. Thus, µ(i) = µ′(i).
Step 7. Denote by f t(i) the t-th application of f , i.e., f1(i) = f(i) and f t(i) = f(f t−1(i)).
Then for all i ∈ N , there exists a t ∈ N such that f t(i) = i.
In the sequence σi = (i, f
1(i), f2(i), . . .) the finiteness of N implies that at least some j ∈ N
has to appear more than once. Hence, there exists a t˜ such that f t˜(i) = fp(i) for some p < t˜.
Let t be the minimal such t˜. Then, f t(i) = i. To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that
f t(i) 6= i. Then the sequence σi equals
σi = (i = i0, i1, i2, . . . , ip−1, ip, ip+1, . . . , it−1, it = ip, ip+1, . . .) where ip 6= i.
By minimality of t, all agents in {i, i1, . . . , it−1} are distinct. Since ip = f(ip−1) = f(it−1), ip
has to be part of two distinct pairs in µ and µ′, respectively. Strict preferences imply that f(ip)
is either ip−1 or it−1. In either case, however, f(f(ip)) = ip and Step 6 implies µ(ip) = µ
′(ip).
A contradiction.
As a result, each agent belongs to a unique cycle and the set of cycles induces a partition
of N . We denote the cycle that i belongs to by ci and the set of agents in ci by Si ⊆ N . The
partition then equals {Si}i∈N .
Step 8. For all i ∈ N , if µ(i) 6= µ′(i), then |Si| ≥ 4 and |Si| is even.
Steps 4 and 6 exclude cycles of length 1 or 2, respectively. Together with |Si| even, it follows
that |Si| ≥ 4. The second part follows from the alternation property in Step 5. Suppose without
loss of generality that agent i0 = i (strictly) prefers matching µ. Then, by Step 5, i1 = f(i)
prefers µ′, i2 = f(f(i)) prefers µ, etc. So, all agents ih with h being an even number prefer µ
and all agents ih with h being an odd number prefer µ
′. As µ′(i) 6= µ(i), only an agent ih∗ with
h∗ being an odd number can close the cycle. Hence, |Si| = |{i0, i1, . . . , ih∗}| is even.
Step 9. Recall that there is a blocking pair {r, s} ⊆ N (r 6= s) for µ that is not a blocking pair
for µ′. Hence, there is an agent h ∈ {r, s} with µ′Phµ (if µRhµ
′ for all h ∈ {r, s} then {r, s} also
blocks µ′, which would be a contradiction). Without loss of generality let r = 1 prefer µ′ over µ
and denote c1 = (1, 2, . . . , p) (according to Step 8, p ≥ 4 and even). For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p−1},
Step 5 and µ′ P1 µ imply that µ
′(i) = i + 1 if i is odd, µ(i) = i + 1 if i is even, and µ(p) = 1.
Hence,
µ′ = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, . . . , {p − 3, p − 2}, {p − 1, p}, . . .},
µ = {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . , {p − 2, p − 1}, {p, 1}, . . .}.
Let µ2 be the matching that results from µ1 = µ by matching blocking pair {r = 1, s}. As
f(2) = µ(2) = 3 by Step 5, and therefore 2 prefers 3 = µ(2) over 1 = µ′(2), it follows that s 6= 2
such that {1, s} is not a pair in µ′. Hence,
m(µ2, µ
′) =


m(µ, µ′) if µ(s) 6= µ′(s);
m(µ, µ′)− 1 if µ(s) = µ′(s) = s;
m(µ, µ′)− 2 if µ(s) = µ′(s) 6= s.
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Note that at matching µ2, agent p is unmatched. Then, individual rationality of µ
′ implies
µ′ Pp µ2 with µ
′(p) = p− 1. Note that
µ2(p − 1) =


1 if s = p− 1;
p− 1 if s = p− 2;
p− 2 if s 6= p− 1, p − 2.
By Step 5, f(p− 1) = µ′(p− 1) = p and therefore µ′ Pp−1 µ2 if µ2(p− 1) ∈ {p− 1, p− 2}. Hence,
{p− 1, p} blocks µ2 if s 6= p− 1.
Case 1. s 6= p − 1. Then, {p − 1, p} blocks µ2. Let µ3 be the matching that results from µ2
by matching this blocking pair. If µ(s) 6= µ′(s), then m(µ3, µ
′) = m(µ, µ′) + 2 as desired for
Lemma 5.
Now suppose µ(s) = µ′(s) (which implies s /∈ {1, . . . , p}). Then µ3 = {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . , {p−
2}, {p− 1, p}, {1, s}, . . . , {µ′(s)}, . . .} in case µ′(s) 6= s and µ3 = {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . , {p− 2}, {p−
1, p}, {1, s}, . . .} in case µ′(s) = s. In either case, m(µ3, µ
′) ≥ m(µ, µ′). Observe that p − 2 is
unmatched in µ3.
Suppose that p ≥ 6. Then, individual rationality of µ′ and f(p − 3) = µ′(p − 3) = p − 2
implies that {p− 3, p− 2} blocks µ3. Let µ4 be the matching that results from µ3 by matching
this blocking pair. Then, m(µ4, µ
′) ≥ m(µ, µ′) + 2 as desired for Lemma 5.
Now suppose p < 6, i.e., p = 4 (Step 8). Recall that {1, s} blocks µ (and, hence, s
prefers 1 over µ(s) = µ′(s)). Since {r = 1, s} is not a blocking pair for µ′, agent 1 prefers
µ′(1) = 2 over s. But for p = 4 and µ(s) = µ′(s), µ3 = {{2}, {3, 4}, {1, s}, . . . , {µ
′(s)}}
in case µ′(s) 6= s and µ3 = {{2}, {3, 4}, {1, s}, . . .} in case µ
′(s) = s. In either case, µ3 is
blocked by {1, 2}. The matching that results from µ3 by matching this blocking pair equals
µ4 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, . . . , {s}, . . . , {µ
′(s)}} in case µ′(s) 6= s and µ4 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, . . . , {s}, . . .}
in case µ′(s) = s. Note that m(µ4, µ
′) ≥ m(µ, µ′) + 2 as desired for Lemma 5.
Case 2. s = p− 1 (which implies µ(s) 6= µ′(s)).
Suppose p ≥ 6. Then,
µ = {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . , {p − 2, s}, {p, 1}, . . .},
µ2 = {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . , {p − 2}, {p}, {1, s}, . . .},
and the individual rationality of µ′ together with f(p − 3) = µ′(p − 3) = p − 2 implies that
{p−3, p−2} blocks µ2. The matching that results from µ2 by matching this blocking pair equals
µ3 = {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . , {p−4}, {p−3, p−2}, {p}, {1, s}, . . .} and exhibitsm(µ3, µ
′) = m(µ, µ′)+2
as desired for Lemma 5.
Finally, suppose p = 4, i.e., {r, s} = {1, 3}. Then,
µ′ = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, . . .},
µ = {{2, 3}, {4, 1}, . . .},
µ2 = {{1, 3}, {2}, {4}, . . .}.
Since {r, s} = {1, 3} does not block µ′, 2 P1 3 or 4 P3 1. Suppose without loss of generality
that 2 P1 3. Then, {1, 2} blocks µ2 and the matching that results from µ2 by matching this
blocking pair equals µ3 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, . . .} and exhibits m(µ3, µ
′) = m(µ, µ′) + 2 as desired
for Lemma 5.
22
C The Restricted Mistake Dynamics
In Section 3.2 we define perturbations of the dynamic process, or the mistake dynamics, as
follows. We assume that in every period a pair {i, j} (possibly i 6= j) is selected. If the pair is a
blocking pair and not yet matched, then they can match without making a mistake. However,
if the pair is not a blocking pair, we assume that they end up being matched (by mistake) with
probability ǫ > 0. This definition of the mistake dynamics coincides with that of Jackson and
Watts (2002, p. 277) for network formation. However, in their analysis of stochastically stable
matchings for marriage problems, Jackson and Watts (2002, Section 5) employ a more restrictive
mistake dynamics:14 a pair {i, j} with i 6= j that is matched becomes by mistake unmatched in
the next period with probability ǫ > 0. In our model this corresponds to restricting mistakes
to single agents, i.e., the only “pairs” {i, j} that make mistakes are those with i = j (who then
by mistake matches with himself, i.e., he unmatches from his current partner). We refer to this
dynamics as the restricted mistake dynamics. Hence, our original mistake dynamics allows for
a larger set of mistakes than the restricted mistake dynamics; in particular, we allow for the
matching of a non-blocking pair {i, j} with i 6= j.
In the remainder of this appendix we consider the restricted mistake dynamics. This restric-
tion only affects one argument in Step 2 (and the corresponding arguments in Steps 3 up to k)
in the proof of Theorem 2. In the following, we show how these steps can be modified such that
the proof of Theorem 2 also works for the restricted mistake dynamics.
Modified proof of Theorem 2. Consider Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2 and let µ1 and µ2 be
as defined there, i.e., µ1 ∈ A1 and µ2 ∈ A2 with A1, A2 ∈ A(R) such that µ1 and µ2 minimize
the distance between A1 and A2.
According to Theorems 6 and 7 in In˜arra et al. (2008a), the set of agents in a roommate
problem R can be uniquely divided into satisfied and dissatisfied agents. In an absorbing set
A ∈ A(R), any satisfied agent is matched with exactly one agent (possibly with himself), while
any dissatisfied agent has at least two different matches in A. Moreover, the restriction of an
absorbing set to the set of satisfied agents is a stable matching and the restrictions of any two
absorbing sets to the set of dissatisfied agents are identical.15 Since µ1 and µ2 minimize the
distance between A1 and A2, dissatisfied agents are matched with the same partners in µ1 and
µ2. Hence, µ1 6= µ2 implies that there exists a pair of satisfied agents {i, j} such that µ1(i) = j,
µ2(i) = k and k 6= j.
16 As the restrictions of µ1 and µ2 to the set of satisfied agents are stable,
they are also decomposable, i.e., j = µ1(i) Pi µ2(i) = k implies l := µ2(j) Pj µ1(j) = i and
k = µ2(i) Pi µ1(i) = j implies i = µ1(j) Pj µ2(j) =: l.
17 Suppose, without loss of generality,
that j = µ1(i) Pi µ2(i) = k (and therefore l = µ2(j) Pj µ1(j) = i). Now consider the matching
that results from µ2 by unmatching {j, l}. In this matching, agent j is single and {i, j} is a
blocking pair (because i prefers j to his current mate k). Denote the matching that results from
14See the corresponding discussion in (Jackson and Watts, 2002, p. 285).
15This is for instance reflected by the figures that accompany the proof of Theorem 2: all absorbing sets have
the same number of matchings.
16Similarly as for stable matchings we can conclude that any satisfied agent who is alone in some absorbing
matching is also alone in all other absorbing matchings. For solvable roommate markets, this statement boils
down to the well-known result that the set of single agents is the same for all stable matchings (see Gusfield
and Irving, 1989, Theorem 4.5.2 or Klaus and Klijn, 2008, Theorem 1 for an elementary proof). As i and j are
satisfied agents, we then can conclude that i 6= j.
17See Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Lemma 4.3.9 or Klaus and Klijn, 2008, Lemma 2 for an elementary proof.
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matching {i, j} by µ˜2. Note that m(µ1, µ˜2) > m(µ1, µ2) and therefore, m(A1, µ˜2) > m(A1, A2).
By construction, it takes only one mistake to connect µ2 and µ˜2. Having constructed µ˜2, Step 2
of the proof proceeds in exactly the same way as in Section 4.2. Theorem 1 guarantees that
there is a blocking path from µ˜2 to a matching µˆ1 ∈ A1 such that A2 can be connected with
µ ∈ A1 with one mistake.
Similarly, for Step l ∈ {3, . . . , k}, In˜arra et al. (2008b, Theorems 6 and 7) and decomposabil-
ity imply the existence of a path with only one mistake from µl ∈ Al with m(A1, µl) = m(A1, Al)
to µ˜l with m(A1, µ˜l) > m(A1, Al). Again, Theorem 1 guarantees that there is a blocking path
from µ˜l to a matching µˆ ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Al−1 such that Al can be connected with the µ-tree
constructed in Steps 2 to l − 1 with one mistake. The rest of the proof of Theorem 2 is not
altered by the restriction of the mistake dynamics. Hence, for every A ∈ A(R) and µ ∈ A, there
exists a µ-tree with resistance |A(R)| − 1 which implies that A(R) = SS(R) and reestablishes
Theorem 2 for the restricted mistake dynamics. 2
Note that the above proof utilizes structural properties of the roommate problem (decompos-
ability and the structural properties of absorbing matchings concerning satisfied and dissatisfied
agents as established by In˜arra et al., 2008b) that are not necessary if we use our original mistake
dynamics. Having established Theorem 2 for the restricted mistake dynamics, we also obtain
Corollaries 1 and 2 for the restricted mistake dynamics. In particular, we obtain Jackson and
Watts’s (2002) Theorem 2, as a corollary to Theorem 2 for the restricted mistake dynamics.
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D A Roommate Market
The following example was kindly provided by Elena Molis.
Example 3. We consider a non-solvable roommate market with 8 agents N = {1, . . . , 8}.
Table 3 lists agents’ preferences in its columns, e.g., agent 1’s preferences are such that 2P1 3P1
4 P1 6 P1 5 P1 7 P1 8 P1 1.
agent 1 agent 2 agent 3 agent 4 agent 5 agent 6 agent 7 agent 8
2 3 1 6 4 7 5 3
3 1 2 3 7 4 6 8
4 4 4 5 1 2 1 1
6 5 5 1 2 3 2 2
5 6 6 2 3 1 3 7
7 8 7 7 6 5 4 4
8 7 8 8 8 8 8 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6
Table 3: Example 3 – preferences.
The set of absorbing matchings equals A(R) = {µ4, µ5, µ6, µ7} and the set of P -stable matchings
equals PS(R) = {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, µ6} where
µ1 = [{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}, {8}],
µ2 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}, {8}],
µ3 = [{1, 3}, {2}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}, {8}],
µ4 = [{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 6}, {5, 7}, {8}],
µ5 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 6}, {5, 7}, {8}],
µ6 = [{1, 3}, {2}, {4, 6}, {5, 7}, {8}],
µ7 = [{1, 2}, {3, 8}, {4, 6}, {5, 7}].
Hence, A(R) ( PS(R) and A(R) ) PS(R). Furthermore, observe that µ7 /∈ MS(R) and
µ1 ∈ MS(R), which implies A(R) ( MS(R) and A(R) ) MS(R). Finally, since µ5 /∈ AS(R)
and µ1 ∈ AS(R) we also have A(R) ( AS(R) and A(R) ) AS(R). ⋄
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